TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/102290/1022006.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 5.6 KB | 115 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 43

The Need to Negotiate

By JIMMY CARTER


A former President argues that it is time now to think about
peace talks and that King Hussein should play a major role


    Hardening positions make a peaceful resolution of the
Persian Gulf crisis ever less likely. How can we make the best
of this situation and heal the fractured region when the crisis
is over?

    Despite bold and concerted action of the U.N. Security
Council, a remarkable demonstration of leadership by the U.S.
in marshaling forces to defend Saudi Arabia, world condemnation
and economic sanctions, there are no indications that Saddam
Hussein is considering a withdrawal from Kuwait or the return
of the Emir's family. With oil-price increases disturbing the
world economy and with patience wearing thin, the world will
inevitably turn to other issues, making it difficult to
increase or even sustain the present level of economic pressure.
If Saddam does not yield, the forced ejection of Iraqi troops
by military action is the only remaining option. Some also
advocate the destruction of Iraq's warmaking capability,
speaking of almost bloodless "surgical" air strikes, the
incompetence or disloyalty of Iraqi troops, sustained worldwide
support if the U.S. invades without U.N. sanction, and a more
stable Middle East after Iraq is destroyed. These assumptions
are doubtful. Military forces of America and its allies can
surely prevail, but there will be serious human, economic and
political costs.

    It is incongruous to exalt Iraq's military threat while
disparaging the competence of the Iraqis to defend their own
land. The inability of either side to prevail in eight years
of seesaw battles across the Iraqi-Iranian border supports the
claim of military strategists that a 3-to-1 advantage is
necessary for invaders. Martyrdom among devout Muslims must
also be considered.

    There is little doubt that an attack on Iraq without further
provocation from Saddam will erode U.S. support in the Middle
East. The Arab League is already split down the middle, with
at least nine of its members, including some that offer lip
service to the U.N. resolutions, giving overt backing to Iraq.
Iran is, at best, equivocal. Saddam tries to build on this
support with appeals based on brotherhood, religion and the
Palestinian cause. It is interesting to note that he has never
criticized his Syrian brothers for sending forces to Saudi
Arabia, nor has he built up troops along their common border.
Most Muslim believers are uncomfortable with Western troops
in their holy lands. Iraq's propagandists also remind poor
Arabs, both individuals and nations, that oil-rich royal
families have invested almost a trillion dollars in the Western
world. They publicized the recent loss by a Saudi prince of
$130 million at a European roulette wheel  in one night. Armed
conflict can exacerbate all these concerns and may unleash a
violent grass-roots reaction.

    Another sobering fact is that international support is not
solid. Beginning with the Helsinki summit, the Soviets have
indicated that they will support only a U.N. military action
(which is subject to  a Chinese veto). Also, they continue to
connect Iraq-Kuwait and Israel-Palestinian issues.

    So far, the Bush Administration has not acknowledged the
need for negotiations or exploratory talks, which might imply
weakness or a willingness to reverse adamant public statements.
Initiating peace talks is always difficult, as we remember from
Korea and Vietnam. Only unconditional surrender following a
total military victory can remove the need for negotiated
settlements.

    No matter what happens in the next few months, including
total capitulation of Iraq, we should be preparing for a time
when negotiations will be required. There are few
intermediaries who might expedite this process: U.N. officials;
French, Soviet or other allies of ours; or leaders among the
Arab nations. Any of these would be suitable, but my own
preference is the Arab community. Soon after Iraq invaded
Kuwait, an Arab plan was offered in Paris, Moscow and other
places. It called for Iraqis to be replaced by other Arab
troops in Kuwait, a U.N. or Arab force to relieve Western
forces in Saudi Arabia, and then a referendum to be held under
international supervision to let Kuwaitis decide their own
future. These initial ideas are unacceptable by either side,
but later modifications may lead to peace.

    Among Arab leaders, King Hussein of Jordan can play a key
role. He is an honorable and peace-loving man who does not
deserve the harsh treatment he is receiving. He has supported
the U.N. resolutions that demand foreign troop withdrawal from
Kuwait, the return of the Emir and his family, and the
imposition of economic sanctions. The King made these decisions
even though Jordan shares a vulnerable border with Iraq and
many of his countrymen support Saddam Hussein. Now the
Jordanian monarch faces the loss of financial assistance from
Saudi Arabia and others. The very survival of his nation is
endangered. It would be a tragedy to permit the further
destruction of Jordan. Even if other intermediaries serve, a
stable Jordan will be needed in the future. A much better
alternative would be for King Hussein to be recognized in the
U.S., as he has been in other countries, as a key leader who,
at an early stage, might help bring about a peaceful settlement
of the gulf crisis -- when and if it is understood that this
is the only alternative to war.